- Currently if the password, primary mail, TOTP or security keys are
changed, no notification is made of that and makes compromising an
account a bit easier as it's essentially undetectable until the original
person tries to log in. Although other changes should be made as
well (re-authing before allowing a password change), this should go a
long way of improving the account security in Forgejo.
- Adds a mail notification for password and primary mail changes. For
the primary mail change, a mail notification is sent to the old primary
mail.
- Add a mail notification when TOTP or a security keys is removed, if no
other 2FA method is configured the mail will also contain that 2FA is
no longer needed to log into their account.
- `MakeEmailAddressPrimary` is refactored to the user service package,
as it now involves calling the mailer service.
- Unit tests added.
- Integration tests added.
just some refactoring bits towards replacing **util.OptionalBool** with
**optional.Option[bool]**
---------
Co-authored-by: KN4CK3R <admin@oldschoolhack.me>
(cherry picked from commit f6656181e4a07d6c415927220efa2077d509f7c6)
Conflicts:
models/repo/repo_list_test.go
trivial shared fixture count conflicts
During registration, one may be required to give their email address, to
be verified and activated later. However, if one makes a mistake, a
typo, they may end up with an account that cannot be activated due to
having a wrong email address.
They can still log in, but not change the email address, thus, no way to
activate it without help from an administrator.
To remedy this issue, lets allow changing the email address for logged
in, but not activated users.
This fixes gitea#17785.
Signed-off-by: Gergely Nagy <forgejo@gergo.csillger.hu>
(cherry picked from commit aaaece28e4c6a8980cef932e224e84933d7c9262)
(cherry picked from commit 639dafabec0a5c1f943b44ca02f72c5ba2fc5e10)
(cherry picked from commit d699c12cebea7dbbda950ae257a46d53c39f22ea)
[GITEA] Allow changing the email address before activation (squash) cache is always active
This needs to be revisited because the MailResendLimit is not enforced
and turns out to not be tested.
See e7cb8da2a8 * Always enable caches (#28527)
(cherry picked from commit 43ded8ee30ab5c7a40a456600cdaa8a0fbdccec2)
Rate limit pre-activation email change separately
Changing the email address before any email address is activated should
be subject to a different rate limit than the normal activation email
resending. If there's only one rate limit for both, then if a newly
signed up quickly discovers they gave a wrong email address, they'd have
to wait three minutes to change it.
With the two separate limits, they don't - but they'll have to wait
three minutes before they can change the email address again.
The downside of this setup is that a malicious actor can alternate
between resending and changing the email address (to something like
`user+$idx@domain`, delivered to the same inbox) to effectively halving
the rate limit. I do not think there's a better solution, and this feels
like such a small attack surface that I'd deem it acceptable.
The way the code works after this change is that `ActivatePost` will now
check the `MailChangeLimit_user` key rather than `MailResendLimit_user`,
and if we're within the limit, it will set `MailChangedJustNow_user`. The
`Activate` method - which sends the activation email, whether it is a
normal resend, or one following an email change - will check
`MailChangedJustNow_user`, and if it is set, it will check the rate
limit against `MailChangedLimit_user`, otherwise against
`MailResendLimit_user`, and then will delete the
`MailChangedJustNow_user` key from the cache.
Fixes#2040.
Signed-off-by: Gergely Nagy <forgejo@gergo.csillger.hu>
(cherry picked from commit e35d2af2e56f4ecb3a4f6d1109d02c8aa1a6d182)
(cherry picked from commit 03989418a70d3445e0edada7fbe5a4151d7836b1)
(cherry picked from commit f50e0dfe5e90d6a31c5b59e687580e8b2725c22b)
(cherry picked from commit cad9184a3653e6c80de2e006a0d699b816980987)
(cherry picked from commit e2da5d7fe13a685606913a131687a94f9f5fcfeb)
(cherry picked from commit 3a80534d4db523efe56b368489f81dc1cb2c99f7)
- Add a dropdown to the web interface for changing files to select which
Email should be used for the commit. It only shows (and verifies) that a
activated mail can be used, while this isn't necessary, it's better to
have this already in place.
- Added integration testing.
- Resolves https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/issues/281
(cherry picked from commit 564e701f407c0e110f3c7a4102bf7ed7902b815f)
(cherry picked from commit de8f2e03cc7d274049dd6a849b3d226968782644)
(cherry picked from commit 0182cff12ed4b68bd49ebc2b9951d9a29f7a36ca)
(cherry picked from commit 9c74254d4606febd702315c670db4fb6b14040a1)
(cherry picked from commit 2f0b68f821ae53dd12b496cc660353d5bf7cd143)
(cherry picked from commit 079b995d49ba7a625035fe9ec53741f6b0112007)
(cherry picked from commit 6952ea6ee3de8157d056c4381de7529de6eaef7b)
(cherry picked from commit 6c7d5a5d140152be80ec38a979a2a7b704ce653a)
(cherry picked from commit 49c39f0ed5a011b26f2e33f35811bb31fab3cf64)
(cherry picked from commit a8f9727388192c6c22b2f8cbbae15a96203ec3b6)
Fixes#28660
Fixes an admin api bug related to `user.LoginSource`
Fixed `/user/emails` response not identical to GitHub api
This PR unifies the user update methods. The goal is to keep the logic
only at one place (having audit logs in mind). For example, do the
password checks only in one method not everywhere a password is updated.
After that PR is merged, the user creation should be next.
Part of #27065
This reduces the usage of `db.DefaultContext`. I think I've got enough
files for the first PR. When this is merged, I will continue working on
this.
Considering how many files this PR affect, I hope it won't take to long
to merge, so I don't end up in the merge conflict hell.
---------
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Change all license headers to comply with REUSE specification.
Fix#16132
Co-authored-by: flynnnnnnnnnn <flynnnnnnnnnn@github>
Co-authored-by: John Olheiser <john.olheiser@gmail.com>
For security reasons, all e-mail addresses starting with
non-alphanumeric characters were rejected. This is too broad and rejects
perfectly valid e-mail addresses. Only leading hyphens should be
rejected -- in all other cases e-mail address specification should
follow RFC 5322.
Co-authored-by: Andreas Fischer <_@ndreas.de>
Co-authored-by: 6543 <6543@obermui.de>
Co-authored-by: zeripath <art27@cantab.net>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
